Abstract: A method of supervaluation for Kripke's theory of truth is presented. It diers from Kripke's own method in that it employs trees; results in a compositional semantics; assigns the intuitively correct truth values to the sentences of a particularly tricky example of Gupta's; and it is argued is acceptable as an explication of the correspondence theory of truth.
1 But that 1 See for example (Walicki 2009 ), according to which truth values are not assigned in a should not be necessary; the truth of B4 and A3 and the falsity of A5 are intuitively grounded. The truth of B4 is intuitively grounded merely in the facts that A1, A2, and A4 are false and that A3 and A5 are contradictory. No specic assignment of truth values to A3 and A5 is presupposed. However, when B4 has been assigned the value of truth, the truth of A3 and the falsity of A5 are subsequently grounded in the truth of B1B4.
I will argue that a proper theory of correspondence or grounded truth ought to deliver the intuitive result (section 1). It will further be argued that none of the versions of Kripke's theory (sections 1 and 2) nor revision theory (section 3) is a satisfactory theory in that respect. Then an alternative will be explored (from section 4 onwards). It is a modication of Kripke's theory using a method of supervaluation on trees. It is not the ambition to deliver
The Correct Theory of Grounded Truth, just to introduce the tree method which I believe is an important step towards such a theory but doesn't get us there by itself.
1
Correspondence and grounded truth
Grass is green is true because the sentence corresponds in the right way to the fact that grass is green. This is one instance of the general claim that is the correspondence theory of truth.
2 The correspondence relation is a relation from the class of sentences to the class of facts.
Another instance is that `grass is green' is true is true because this sentence corresponds to the fact that grass is green is true. This instance reveals that even though the domain and codomain of the correspondence relation are disjoint, every fact gives rise to an iteration of truths. The reason is that each truth begets a fact, namely the fact that the sentence in question is true.
So the correspondence relation has its basis in the class of non-semantical facts but also, so to speak, feeds into itself to form an innite hierarchy of truths further and further away from that basis.
I take grounding to be a generalization of correspondence. First, grounding is a transitive relation while correspondence is not. The truth of `grass is green' is true is grounded in the fact that grass is green, but it does not correspond to it. Second, grounding is also a relation between (the truth or falsity of ) complex sentences and (the truth or falsity of ) their constituents.
For instance, the truth of a disjunction can be grounded in the truth of one of its disjuncts, while it does not seem right to say that it corresponds to it. 2 See for instance (Austin 1950) and (Kirkham 1992) .
3 Attempts have also been made to generalize grounding beyond semantics to also cover, for example, the relation that obtains between a set and its members, and even further, to make grounding serve as an all-encompassing metaphysically explanatory concept (Schaffer 2009 ). This direction of generalization is beyond the scope of this paper. make all those sentences that correspond to those facts true. Now there are a number of semantical facts in addition to the non-semantical facts, namely, facts about which sentences are true. Then we make all those sentences that correspond to the enlarged set of facts true. And so on.
This idea can already be found in Tarski's (1933 Tarski's ( , 1944 ) theory of truth.
With his basic theory, Kripke contributed two things. First, he showed how to put the dierent levels of this iteration into one language (although by his own admission (1975, p. 714 ) the success here is only partial). Second, he showed how to capture formally the intuitive verdict that the idea of grounding provides in the case of the Watergate example and structurally similar cases. Watergate are true and that ten are false. That is a fact that the quoted utterance of Jones can correspond to in the next iteration so as to be made true. If all Jones' other claims on the subject are also true, then there is thereafter a fact that the quoted utterance of Nixon corresponds to.
The reason why the explanation three paragraphs back is a simplication is that the basis is not completely devoid of semantic facts. Facts concerning what sentences are about are semantic facts, and they have to be included in the basis, if the truth values of the Watergate sentences are to come out right. The only semantic facts that cannot be in the basis are those that are dened by the iteration. All facts available at a given level can be used for grounding.
With this in mind, consider Gupta's example again. In the rst iteration, A1, A2, A4, B1, B2, and B3 can be given proper truth values (true or false; the value of undened will be called a truth value but not a proper truth value) by corresponding (positively or negatively) to non-semantic facts. At this point, the fact that A3 and A5 contradict each other is also available, so in combination with the falsity of A1, A2, and A4, we have the facts that B4 need to correspond to in order to be true. Subsequently, A3 can be made true and A5 false by correspondence to the truth of B1-B4.
All nine sentences can be given grounded truth values. Therefore, these sentences constitute a challenge to any theory which purports to be about grounded truth, such as Kripke's. Let us call it Gupta's Challenge. Kripke (1975, p. 706) denes grounded, as a predicate applicable to sentences, as meaning that the sentence has a proper truth value in the minimal xed point. One thing that Gupta's Challenge teaches us is that the minimal xed point of the strong Kleene valuation schema does not fully capture the informal notion of groundedness. We will aim at doing better in that respect.
In order to focus the paper and avoid having to justify every design choice and engage with every competing theory on the market, it will be assumed, rather than argued for, that capturing the informal notion of groundedness is what a theory of truth should aim for.
Note also that the intuitive reasoning for the truth values of the nine sentences does not employ any dangerous principles, i.e. principles that could lead to inconsistency if used in other situations. The only principle used here
that goes beyond what is validated by the basic version of Kripke's theory is the inference rule, from the inconsistency of two sentences, conclude that at most one of them is true, which is perfectly benign. Hence, there is no good excuse for a theory that delivers another result.
That there are two sentences that cannot both be true is a semantic fact that is not dened by the iteration, but is available from the outset. 4 Or rather: may be. It is a fact from the outset that φ and ¬φ cannot both be true. If ψ becomes false at level 7, then at level 7 it also becomes a fact that ψ ∨ φ and ¬φ cannot both be true.
To sum up, I will take two of the success criteria for a theory of truth to be that it can reasonably be seen as an explication of the correspondence theory and that it can handle Gupta's Challenge adequately. A third success criterion for a theory of truth, to be introduced in section 2, is that it is compositional (i.e. that the connectives and quantiers are truth-functional). 
. See (Kripke 1975, p. 711 The idea I am relying on here is the following: Reality consists of some non-semantic facts plus some semantic facts that are grounded in the nonsemantic facts. The xed point consists of the latter and is therefore a part of reality. In the basic version of Kripke's theory, the levels prior to the xed point contain correct, but partial, information about the totality of semantic facts. What is grounded in these is therefore grounded in reality. On the other hand, what is grounded only in evaluations that disagree with the xed point is based on ctions.
A concrete symptom of this philosophical problem is that Kripke's method for supervaluation declares all classically valid sentences true. This is very misleading in a semantics that is strictly weaker than classical semantics.
A prominent example is that the disjunction of the Liar and its negation is true even though neither of the disjuncts is made true. When taking the step from bivalent to trivalent semantics, it seems clear that the property from the information that a disjunction is true, it is possible to conclude that at least one of the disjuncts is as well, is more important to preserve than the property every disjunction of a sentence with its negation is true. The former is needed for the inference rule of disjunction elimination to be valid. 
The set B of best candidates for the set of truths is the set of evaluations B, such that for some interpretation t, for all ordinals α, there is an ordinal β > α such that B = T β (t) (Gupta 1982, p. 4445 11 Ergo, the T-schema is not validated, so according to Tarski's (1944, p. 344 ) adequacy condition, these candidate truth predicates are not truth predicates at all.
These evaluations cannot reasonably be seen as correspondence-theoretically acceptable solutions to the paradoxes. They can, at best, be credited with being adequate theories of the semantics of non-pathological sentences.
12
But I wouldn't even go that far, for the advantages of revision theory over Kripke's theory are achieved using techniques that are not justiable from the standpoint of the correspondence theory of truth, for the construction of each of the sequences is not based on reality alone, but also on an initial evaluation that is not reality but a ction.
13
A dierent version of revision theory can be seen as an attempt at dealing with this problem of reliance on ctions in the rst version, namely the version were we consider the real truths to be the stable truths, and the real falsehoods to be the stable falsehoods.
14 We supervaluate over all initial evaluations and all the best candidates they result in, obtaining one denite set of truths and one denite set of falsehoods. This method also gives us sentences that are neither. Again, we have a trivalent semantics.
The best candidates for the extension of truth are unacceptable because they are each based on just one initial evaluation which is a ction and not reality.
Supervaluations can be seen as an attempt to resolve this problem. The rationale would be that while one evaluation is a ction, what is true relative to all possible evaluations is based upon facts; so the truths and falsehoods that are common to all possible evaluations are based on reality, no matter the contingent state of reality, and thus they are correspondence-theoretically acceptable. However, this rationale does not hold, for the supervaluation gives rise to a trivalent semantics, and when one accepts such a semantics, one can no longer hold the set of all bivalent truth-value ascriptions to represent all possible realities. Here there is an interesting catch-22 phenomenon:
in the attempt to consider all possible realities, one has to admit that they are not all the possible realities after all. For a supervaluation theory to be acceptable, the kind of evaluations (bivalent, trivalent) quantied over must be of the same kind as the possible outcomes of this supervaluation.
I will
11 At least that is the case with the successor stage candidates. With some of the limit stage candidates, it is not. But in these, the truth values of some sentences are just the arbitrary value of the initial evaluation, so any advantage these candidates may have over the successor stage candidates is purely a result of arbitrariness.
12 And perhaps as an interesting analysis of the paradoxes in the form of the dierent revision patterns to which they give rise. This seems to be Herzberger's (1982) point with his version of the revision theory.
13 Gupta most often uses the word hypothesis, but also in one instance (1982, p. 38) calls such an evaluation a ction.
14 A sentence s is stably true if s ∈ B and stably false if s / ∈ B, where B is as dened in footnote 10 (Gupta 1982, p. 46) . happens when the initial evaluation is one that assigns falsity to all the sentences involved (the pattern in levels 13 is repeated in levels 46 and ad innitum):
The intuitive argument presented in the introduction of this paper is equally strong no matter how many additional truth predicates are applied to some of the sentences. Therefore this failure shows that revision theory does not get to the heart of the problem.
16
may be other elds, for example the semantics of vagueness, where the use of supervaluations to go from a set of one kind of evaluations to an evaluation of another kind makes good sense.
16 Variants of the revision theory with dierent limit rules are proposed in (Herzberger 1982) and (Belnap 1982) . According to Gupta, a sentence that has not reached stability at a given limit ordinal should revert to its truth value in the initial evaluation. Herzberger suggests that it should revert to falsity, which will not help. Belnap thinks that we should consider all possible limit rules as long as they retain the truth values of sentences that It has been argued above that we can safely infer that at most one of A3 and A5 can be true. To conclude from this that at most one of A3 and A5* (this example is easily generalizable) can be true, all that is needed is that A5 is true i A5* is true. But that is merely an instance of the rule version of the T-schema which holds in the supervaluation version of revision theory and in all versions of Kripke's. 17 The A3/A5* version of the Challenge is discussed by Gupta and Belnap (1993, p. 228) He further believes that we should quantify over all such rules, and only consider a sentence to be true or false if it stabilizes as such under all rules. On this proposal, the A3/A5* version will also not arrive at the intuitively correct values, as one of the limit rules quantied over is the one starting with universal falsity and always reverting to falsity. Technically it is possible to deal with the Challenge within the framework of revision theory, namely by using fully varied revision sequences; see pages 168 and 228 in (Gupta and Belnap 1993) . Then for each revision sequence there would be a limit ordinal where the right values would be assigned and thereafter kept. However, this is to search for consistent evaluations of sentences (see footnote 1), not to make a sentence true when there is a fact it can be grounded in.
17 A distinction can be made between a weak version of the T-schema in which the biconditional is in the meta-language, namely T (c φ ) is true i φ is true where c φ denotes φ, and a stronger version were the biconditional is in the object language, namely T (c φ ) ↔ φ is true. In this paper attention is restricted to the weak or rule version. The nodes with the sentences B1B3 should of course be assigned the value and the nodes with A1, A2 and A4, the value ⊥. If we assign to the two end nodes with B4, then under the compositional rules we should assign to A3 and ⊥ to A5 and therefore the root should get the value . If we instead assign ⊥ to the end nodes with B4, the assignment to A3 and A5 should be the other way around but again the root gets a .
Lastly, we can assign the value of undened (for which the symbol + will be used) to B4 at the bottom. Recall that A5 is Something B says is not true and that everything else that B says is true. So when B4 is undened and a fortiori not true, A5 is intuitively true. Similarly, A3 (Everything B says is true) is intuitively false. If we assign these values to the two nodes, the root again becomes true. So in all three of the possible realities, B4 becomes true and we can supervaluate it as such.
18
Note that the intuitive argument for the truth values of A3, A5 and B4 does not rely on a hidden premise that these sentences have proper truth values.
Therefore this is a reasonable thing to do.
So using trees is the basic idea. We will formulate a theory that is a modication of Kripke's. We adopt the technique of reaching a xed point through a transnite series of levels of increasingly more extensive partial interpretations of the truth predicate, using a jump rule to get from one level to the next, and taking unions at limit levels. Only the jump rule is new. The assignment of a truth value to a given sentence at a given level is now decided by considering trees for the sentence.
A tree for a given sentence is constructed by placing that sentence at the root, and below that placing nodes with the constituents of that sentence,
18 To understand what is going on here, it is important to recall the distinction made in section 1 between truth values and facts about truth values. The former appear on the language side of the correspondence relation. The latter appear on the reality side, but are induced by truth values that are on the language side of another (more basic) instance of the relation. When B4 can be made true here it is because the supervaluation reveals that there does not have to be a fact on the reality side of the correspondence relation about the truth value of B4 for there to be the facts needed to make B4 true on the language side of the relation. other sentence appears so as to have itself as predecessor (in order not to make it a revision theory) or at any earlier point. Also, we only consider trees for which it holds that each route from the root down through the tree is nite, so that truth values can be assigned to the nodes in a well-founded way and travel all the way from the end nodes to the root.
A tree is evaluated in the direction from the end nodes to the root. The values of some nodes are xed: if the sentence at a given node has a truth value from an earlier level, the node has that value; if it is an atomic sentence with an ordinary predicate, its value is decided in the normal way; if it is an atomic sentence with the truth predicate and a constant not denoting a sentence, it is false. The remaining end nodes can have any of the values true, false and undened, albeit with the restriction that if two nodes are labeled with the same sentence, they must have the same truth value. Indeed, we impose this demand not only on the end nodes, but on all nodes except for the root.
19 The remaining non-end nodes are given values based on the values of the nodes immediately below them.
Even though there are still some particulars to be lled out, it should be clear how this can help with Gupta's Challenge. Consider the tree for the A3*/A5* version in gure 2. The result is the same; the truth values merely have to travel up one more node. This theory is not vulnerable to any kind of iterated uses of the truth predicate in versions of Gupta's Challenge: also the A3/A5* version would work in exactly the same way.
However, there is a problem: it has not been explained exactly what way that is. In the third paragraph of this section, we accounted intuitively for how the assignment of + to the two bottom nodes labeled B4 should result 19 The root is to be thought of as the language side of the correspondence relation and the other nodes as the reality side. That is why we should not extend the restriction to also involve the root. Doing so would have the consequence that a sentence would be made true simply because truth is the only proper truth value it can consistently have.
And it would not be correspondence-theoretically acceptable to have that as a sucient condition.
in the root node being assigned , but not technically. We will not get the desired result if we adapt Kripke's theory directly to the tree setting. If we use strong Kleene for the nodes labeled with a sentence with a connective or a quantier with widest scope, while a sentence of the form T (c φ ), claiming truth of the sentence φ, gets the same value as its successor node labeled φ, then the assignment of + to the two bottom nodes labeled B4 results in the root also getting the value +. In general, such a tree theory would be equivalent to the basic version of Kripke's theory. Some other change is needed as well.
In this paper, I will suggest such a change, but I will not endorse one. I happen to believe that several other, very extensive changes to Kripke's theory should be made, but this paper is not about that; it is about the idea of supervaluating on trees. Therefore, we will be working with the most minimal and uncontroversial change I can think of that is signicant enough to make it possible to demonstrate the virtues of the tree approach.
This change is with the semantics of the truth predicate: for each of the three possible truth values of a sentence φ, what should the truth value of the sentence T (c φ ) be? The naive answer, when the problem of paradox is disregarded, is that T (c φ ) should be true when φ is true, false when φ is false, and also false when φ is undened. 20 However, general use of that rule leads to paradox. If the Liar is undened, the sentence claiming that the Liar is true would become false, and then the negation of that sentence, which is the Liar itself, would become true.
Kripke responds to this problem by not using the naive rule under any circumstances. Instead he always has T (c φ ) undened when φ is undened. Use of this rule is seemingly required to get the monotonicity which is crucial to his construction. Otherwise we run the risk that at some stage T (c φ ) is made false because φ is (still) undened, and then at a later stage φ becomes true and hence T (c φ ) becomes true.
In some cases, the naive rule can be safely employed. Going from Kripke's truth rule to this stronger rule is a step back towards the naive theory of truth which the paradoxes have forced us to abandon; hence it requires no special justication to take that step when it can be done without any unpleasant consequences. It does require special justication not to use the strong rule in all circumstances when it is used in some, but I will not give one. I will accept the ad hoc-ness in the interest of being able to present the idea about trees in near-isolation from other possible modications of Kripke's theory.
The intuitive result in paragraph three of this section can be achieved by using the strong rule in that evaluation of the tree. This can be done in some 20 Do you have a prima facie intuition that φ is not true should be true when φ is undened? Then you either share the mentioned intuition about the truth predicate, or you have an intuition that not should have the semantics of exclusion negation (taking truth to falsity, falsity to truth, and undenedness to truth). The latter intuition could be substituted for (or added to) the former in the following; the results for Gupta's Challenge would be the same. To my mind Yablo (1985, p. 301) argues convincingly for the prima facie strength of the intuition concerning the truth predicate. Kripke (1975, p. 715) himself mentions it is an alternative intuition, although he does not endorse it for the object language.
y y y y y y y y The use of the rule is restricted in two ways that should be distinguished.
First, it is only used in the evaluations that are quantied over. That is, if some sentence φ is left undened at a given level, because the supervaluation for it did not deliver a denite result, that is not taken as a sucient basis for making T (c φ ) false. Second, the strong rule is limited in its application to nodes in a tree that has the root sentence appearing again below it, where it is assigned +. The rst restriction is sucient for avoiding inconsistency. 21
The second restriction is in place to secure compositionality.
22
To see why the second restriction is needed for that job, let us contrast the case of B4 with the example T (c φ ) ∨ ¬T (c φ ) where c φ denotes some sentence φ which is not T (c φ ) ∨ ¬T (c φ ) itself or either of its disjuncts. A tree for this disjunction is the one shown in gure 3. Assigning values to the nodes of this tree in the same way as before, we again arrive at three possibilities. We can assign to the end nodes, which results in the root also getting the value . Assigning ⊥ to the end nodes has the same result. When the end nodes are given the value +, so must the nodes above them including the root, for otherwise we would make any such disjunction true even though there is no guarantee that either of the disjuncts will become true.
As will be demonstrated, this method of supervaluation is reluctant in 21 Theorem 6 below does not depend on the second restriction.
22 So if we were happy with true disjunctions without true disjuncts (as in Kripke's supervaluation), we could formulate a version of the theory with just the rst restriction and handle Gupta's Challenge (unlike in Kripke's supervaluation) with that alone. assigning truth and falsity, to the point that if it does, the compositional demands for that truth value are guaranteed to be satised. For example, if a disjunction is made true, then one of its disjuncts will be too.
In this way, the three problems mentioned at the end of the last section are solved. First, the xed point is compositional. Second, the three-valued evaluations are reached by quantifying over three-valued evaluations, such that we are genuinely taking all possibilities into account. And third, iterations of the truth predicate in Gupta's Challenge is not a problem. With this theory we check the consequences, for the truth value of a sentence, of the assignment of dierent truth values to other sentences through several iterations of the truth predicate, while Kripke's theory arbitrarily restricts such consequence-checking to just one iteration.
5
The formal theory
We will formulate the theory using a rst-order language with constants and ordinary predicates that are interpreted in the usual way by a domain D and an interpretation function I. In addition, it has a truth predicate T .
Negation, disjunction and existential quantication are taken as primitive;
and conjunction, the conditional, and universal quantication are dened in the usual way.
Given a w φ, a variable v and a constant c, we understand by φ(v/c) the w that is identical with φ, with the possible exception that all free occurrences of v are replaced with c. For simplicity's sake it is assumed that there is at least one constant for every object in the domain, so that quantication can be treated substitutionally.
As usual we call a w a sentence if it does not contain any free variables.
Let S be the set of sentences. Also in the interest of simplicity (avoiding the need for discussing Gödel coding and diagonal lemmas) the possibility of self-reference is facilitated, following (Gupta 1982) , by assuming S to be a subset of D and by making certain assumptions, when needed, about constants referring to sentences.
We call an ordered pair E = (T, F ) such that T and F are subsets of S an evaluation. 23 We say that E is consistent if T and F are disjoint. We also say that an evaluation E = (T , F ) extends E if T ⊆ T and F ⊆ F .
A tree 24 is a triple T r = (N, <, l) such that N is any set; < is a partial order on N such that for every element of N , the set of predecessors of this element is linearly ordered and nite and there is an element of N called the root that is a predecessor of every other element of N ; and l is a function from N to S. The elements of N are called nodes; a node without successors is called an end node; and for each node n, l(n) is called the label of n. If a node n has a unique immediate successor labeled φ, then n φ denotes this successor.
23 So the letter T is used both for a set of sentences and as a predicate symbol in the language. This should not cause confusion. Given a tree T r = (N, <, l), a trimmed tree of T r is a triple T r = (N , < , l ) in which N is a subset of N , such that
• for each node n of N , if n ∈ N , then all the predecessors of n (by <)
are as well, and
• for each node n of N , of the immediate successors of n, either all of them or none of them are in N , and < and l are the restrictions of < and l, respectively, to N . This and the next two denitions are illustrated in gure 4.
Given a tree T r = (N, <, l) and a node n ∈ N , the sub-tree of T r generated by n is the triple T r = (N , < , l ) such that N is the subset of N consisting of n and all its successors, and < and l are again the restrictions of < and l, respectively, to N . Note that both trimmed trees and sub-trees generated by a node are trees.
A branch of T r is a maximal linearly ordered subset of the nodes of T r.
Given a sentence s, the constituents of s are
• φ and ψ if s is φ ∨ ψ,
• every sentence of the form φ(v/c) where c is a constant if s is ∃vφ,
• the sentence I(c) if s is T (c) and I(c) is a sentence,
• nothing if s is T (c) and I(c) is not a sentence, and
• nothing if s is P (c 1 , . . . , c n ) where P is an ordinary predicate.
Given a sentence s, the full tree for s is the tree such that the root is labeled with s and for every node n, the following holds: 1) If l(n) is s and n is not the root, or one of the constituents of l(n) is the label of a non-root predecessor of n, then n has no successors. 2) Otherwise n has one immediate successor for each of the constituents of l(n), and these successors are labeled with these constituents. A trimmed tree of the full tree for s is called a tree for s if each branch thereof is nite.
Note that this means that the full tree for s is not a tree for s if it has innite branches, as is the case for, e.g., the sentences of Yablo's (1993) Paradox. To be able to evaluate a tree it has to bottom out in end nodes and therefore we cannot always use the full tree. We therefore have to cut it of at some point. This introduces a complication: there is no canonical way to decide how far down to cut it of, so we need to consider a class of trees for each sentence instead of just one. The complication is small though, for if one tree is adequate to rule out enough combinations of truth values to make s true, say, then those combinations really are impossible and s should be made true. On the other hand, if a given combination is not ruled out that may just be because the tree is too small. (Consider for example the tree in gure 1 with the bottom row of B nodes removed; using that trimmed tree it would not be possible to rule out that both A3 and A5 could be true.)
Therefore, it is reasonable to say that a sentence is given a truth value when just one tree provides that judgment, i.e. when all the evaluations for that tree agree.
We dene an evaluation of a tree for some sentence s relative to some evaluation E = (T, F ) (a tree-evaluation or, when there is no risk of misunderstanding, just evaluation) as a function e from the nodes of the tree to { , ⊥, +} such that for every node n, SEa) if n is not the root, then for every other non-root node n such that l(n) = l(n ), e(n) is identical to e(n ); SEb) if l(n) is in T (F ) and n is not the root, then e(n) equals (⊥); SEc) if l(n) is of the form T (c) where c is a constant and I(c) is not a sentence, then e(n) = ⊥; and SE1) if l(n) is of the form P (c 1 , . . . , c n ) where P is an ordinary n-ary predicate and c 1 , . . . , c n are constants, then
• e(n) = if (I(c 1 ), . . . , I(c n )) ∈ I(P ), and • e(n) = ⊥ otherwise, and for every non-end node n, the following is true: SE2) If l(n) is of the form ¬φ where φ is a sentence, then
• e(n) = if e(n φ ) = ⊥, • e(n) = ⊥ if e(n φ ) = , and • e(n) = + otherwise.
SE3) If l(n) is of the form φ ∨ ψ where φ and ψ are sentences, then
• e(n) = if e(n φ ) = or e(n ψ ) = , • e(n) = ⊥ if e(n φ ) = ⊥ and e(n ψ ) = ⊥, and
• e(n) = + otherwise.
SE4) If l(n)
is of the form ∃vφ where v is a variable and φ is a w with at most v free, then
• e(n) = if there exists a constant c such that e(n φ(v/c) ) = , • e(n) = ⊥ if for every constant c it holds that e(n φ(v/c) ) = ⊥, and • e(n) = + otherwise.
SE5) If l(n) is of the form T (c) where c is a constant, then
• e(n) = if e(n I(c) ) = , • e(n) = ⊥ if e(n I(c) ) = ⊥, • e(n) = ⊥ if e(n I(c) ) = + and there is a node labeled l(n) with a successor m with l(m) = s and e(m) = +, and • e(n) = + otherwise.
The third bullet of SE5 is the implementation of the strong truth rule. The second conjunct of the condition imposes the restriction on the use of that strong rule explained in the italicized sentence on page 14, above.
We dene the supervaluation with respect to the evaluation E = (T, F ) as SE E = (ST E , SF E ) where ST E (SF E ) is the set of those sentences s, such that for some tree for s, all evaluations of this tree relative to E have (⊥) as the value of the root.
25 Such a tree decides s with respect to E, and we say that E makes s true (false). In contrast, saying that s is true (false) in E means that s ∈ T (s ∈ F ).
For all ordinals α, the supervaluation at level α, SE α , is dened by recursion:
A tree decides a sentence at a successor level α, if the tree decides the sentence with respect to SE α−1 , and the sentence is then made true/false at level α. Figure 5 shows two examples of trees. The example on the left is the full tree, and also a tree, for the Liar. That is, c l is a constant denoting ¬T (c l ).
At the rst level, this tree has three evaluations. The rst assigns to the end node and to the middle node and ⊥ to the root. The second is the other way around: ⊥ to the two bottom nodes and to the root. The third assigns + to the end node. Then the third bullet of SE5 kicks in and assigns ⊥ to the middle node. So again the root is assigned . Ergo, the evaluations do not agree on a value for the root and hence ¬T (c l ) is not given a truth value in the supervaluation. As the reader can easily verify, the smaller trees for ¬T (c l ) along with the trees for T (c l ) also have disagreeing evaluations.
Therefore, the evaluations for these trees are exactly the same at every level.
25 Note that if there is no evaluation of some tree for a sentence, the sentence becomes both true and false. It needs to be proved that this situation cannot arise. This is done in section 8.
T (c)
¬T (c l )
Figure 5 The example on the right is about the sentence T (c) where I(c) = (P (14) ∨ T (c)) ∧ ¬T (c). The predicate P means is prime and 14 is a constant with the obvious denotation. Intuitively P (14) ∨ T (c) and ¬T (c) contradict each other, since 14 is composite. Ergo T (c) should be false. As in the Liar example, the tree depicted here is both the full tree and a tree for the root sentence. And at the rst level this tree also has three evaluations; SEa and SE1 prevent there from being more. They all assign ⊥ to the node labeled P (14). The rst further assigns to the end nodes labeled T (c) and to the node labeled P (14) ∨ T (c) and ⊥ to all the remaining nodes. The second makes those end nodes ⊥, the node labeled ¬T (c) , and the rest of the nodes ⊥. The third leaves the two end nodes with a +, resulting in the three nodes in the middle getting + too, whereupon the third bullet of SE5 again takes eect so that the root is assigned ⊥. In this case, all the evaluations agree on the root, so T (c) is made false at level 1. As a consequence, at all higher levels this tree only has one evaluation, namely the second mentioned of the three. At level 2, ¬T (c φ ) is made true by the two-node sub-tree generated by the node labeled with that sentence. Similarly, P (14) ∨ T (c) and (P (14)∨T (c))∧¬T (c) are made false at level 2, securing compositionality.
In order to conclude the statement of the theory we need to prove monotonicity, the existence of a xed point, and consistency, but this is postponed to section 8. We refer to the xed point as SE. For all sentences s we set s = if s is in the truth set of SE, s = ⊥ if s is in the falsity set of SE and s = + otherwise. The value of s is of course to be thought of as the truth value of s.
Meeting Gupta's Challenge
We can now apply the theory to Gupta's Challenge. Let A and B be unary predicates interpreted as is a sentence spoken by A and is a sentence spoken by B respectively; and let = be a binary predicate meaning are
(B4) i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i s s s s s s s s s s
j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t
t t t t t t t t t (A5)
t t t t t t t t t t · · · B(c B4 ) → T (c B4 ) t
t t t t t t t t
(B4) Figure 6 identical. Then the sentences A3, A5, and B4 can be formalized as follows:
A tree for (B4) is outlined in gure 6. The constants c A3 , c A5 , and c B4 refer to (A3), (A5), and (B4) respectively. It is here assumed for the sake of simplicity that no other constants refer to these sentences. Another simplication is that it is pretended that conjunction and the conditional are primitive connectives and that multiple sentences can be concatenated with connectives going just one node up. I leave it to the reader to verify that these simplications do not aect the conclusion.
It is easily veried that all instances of the doubly universally quantied sentence (B4) which are not displayed in the gure are assigned the value .
Therefore there are only three essentially dierent evaluations of this tree.
First, there is a tree-evaluation that gives the value to the two end nodes labeled (B4). In this evaluation, the nodes labeled T (c B4 ) have the value , and the node labeled ¬T (c B4 ) the value ⊥. Second, there is a tree-evaluation that assigns the value ⊥ to the two end nodes labeled (B4). The fact that this evaluation also makes the root true follows by analogous reasoning.
The third and nal tree-evaluation gives the value + to the two nodes labeled (B4). Then, by the third bullet of SE5, the nodes labeled T (c B4 ) have the value ⊥, and therefore the rest of the evaluation is exactly as when ⊥ was assigned to the two end nodes labeled (B4).
Because of SEa, there are no other tree-evaluations. From this, it follows from the denition of supervaluation that (B4) is made true at level 1. From monotonicity it then follows that (B4) = .
Then at level 2, we only need to look at the tree for (A3) which ends at the node labeled (B4) (or to put it more precisely: the tree for (A3) which is the sub-tree generated by (A3) in the tree in the gure). Now there is only one evaluation of this tree, namely the one in which the node labeled (B4), and hence the root, is given the value . That is, (A3) is determined to be true at level 2. Similarly and simultaneously, (A5) 
The top row of the rst table only contains the values true and undened and so almost makes B4 true. Not quite, though, for in one tree-evaluation the root is undened. Similarly, B5 is not supervaluated as false.
Making B4 true and B5 false can be done without taking the risk of applying the strong rule for the truth predicate to an undened sentence that at a later stage becomes true. We just need to consider the two sentences simultaneously, a complication that the present rules do not take into account.
We can remedy the situation by amending the theory as follows: For each set of sentences S, we consider all sets of trees containing exactly one tree T r s for each s ∈ S, such that elements of S are only labels of root nodes and end nodes. Then we replace l(m) = s in the third bullet of SE5 with l(m) ∈ S. If it holds for each T r s that all evaluations of it assign the same value to the root, then all the sentences in S are given these root values.
With this change, which is a straightforward generalization of the original theory in which S was only allowed to be a singleton, B4 is made true and B5 false, in accordance with the intuitive verdict. A3 and A5 are similarly given the right truth values (now already at level 1).
To be more precise, we change four of the denitions. First, the denition of full tree is altered to read as follows: given a sentence s and a set of sentences S containing s, the full tree for s relative to S is the tree such that the root is labeled with s and for every node n, the following holds: 1)
If l(n) is an element of S and n is not the root, or one of the constituents of l(n) is the label of a non-root predecessor of n, then n has no successors.
2) Otherwise, n has one immediate successor for each of the constituents of l(n), and these successors are labeled with these constituents. For some examples, consider gure 5 again. The tree on the left is the full tree for ¬T (c l ) relative to S for any S that does not include T (c l ). If S does include T (c l ), the full tree stops one node higher up. Similarly, the tree on the right is the full tree for T (c) relative to any S that does not include any of the three sentences (P (14) ∨ T (c)) ∧ ¬T (c), P (14) ∨ T (c) and ¬T (c). If it does include, say, P (14) ∨ T (c), remove the two left-most end nodes to get the full tree for T (c) relative to S.
Second, the denition of a tree is relativized to S in the obvious way. Third, the denition of tree-evaluation is relativized to S by changing l(m) = s to l(m) ∈ S. And fourth, supervaluation with respect to the evaluation E = (T, F ) is redened as SE E = (ST E , SF E ) where ST E (SF E ) is the set of those sentences s, such that for some set of sentences S containing s and some tree for s relative to S, all evaluations of this tree relative to E and S has (⊥) as the value of the root; and further, that for all the other elements of S there are also trees for them relative to S, all the evaluations of which agree on assigning or agree on assigning ⊥ to the root. Such a tree decides s with respect to E, and we say that E makes s true (false) (among S).
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Theorems and proofs
For this generalized theory we can now prove the promised theorems.
Lemma 1. For any evaluation E, extension E of E, sentence s, set of sentences S containing s, tree T r for s relative to S, and evaluation e of T r relative to S and E , the tree-evaluation e is also an evaluation of T r relative to S and E. Proof. If one of the antecedents of SEb is satised for E, then the same antecedent is satised for E . So a restriction on what counts as an evaluation of the tree imposed by this clause in the case of E also applies in the case of E . The same holds trivially for the other clauses.
Lemma 2. For any evaluation E and extension E of E, SE E is an extension of SE E . Proof. For any sentence s, set of sentences S containing s, and tree for that sentence relative to S, the set of evaluations of the tree relative to S and E is a subset of the set of evaluations of the tree relative to E. This follows from lemma 1. So s satises the criterion for being in ST E (SF E ) if it satises the criterion for being in ST E (SF E ).
Theorem 3 (Monotonicity). For all ordinals α and β, if α < β then SE β is an extension of SE α . Proof. As SE 0 is empty, this follows from lemma 2 by induction.
Theorem 4 (Fixed point).
There is an ordinal α such that for all ordinals
Proof. This follows from Theorem 3 by the usual cardinality argument.
As prematurely mentioned, we refer to the xed point as SE.
The basic idea for the consistency proof is to show that the largest intrinsic xed point of the strong Kleene jump is an extension of SE. For this, we need some denitions.
26 Fixed point of the strong Kleene jump will be shortened to FPSK (and following Kripke, we will take these to include only consistent evaluations). An evaluation E is an intrinsic FPSK if E is an FPSK and it is the case that for any FPSK E there exists an FPSK E that is an extension of both E and E . In that case, the elements of the truth (falsity) set of E are called intrinsically true (false). Of the intrinsic FPSKs, one is the largest (Kripke 1975, p. 709) . We denote it I.
For any set of sentences S, function π : S → { , ⊥} and FPSK E = (T, F ), let E π be (T ∪ π −1 ( ), F ∪ π −1 (⊥)). The closure of (E, π), denoted cl(E, π), is dened as the smallest extension (CT, CF ) of E π such that if φ ∈ CT or ψ ∈ CT , then φ ∨ ψ ∈ CT ; and if φ ∈ CF and ψ ∈ CF then φ ∨ ψ ∈ CF and similarly for negation, the existential quantier and the truth predicate (we refer to these as closure rules). The semi-closure of (E, π), denoted cl − (E, π), is dened as the smallest extension (CT, CF ) of E π such that if φ ∈ CT or ψ ∈ CT and φ ∨ ψ / ∈ S, then φ ∨ ψ ∈ CT ; and if φ ∈ CF and ψ ∈ CF and φ ∨ ψ / ∈ S, then φ ∨ ψ ∈ CF and similarly for negation, etc.
There are two things about these denitions that should be noted. First, closure could just as well have been dened as a function on E π , for it does not matter which truths and falsities comes from E and which from π. The only reason for not dening it like that is the desire to have the wording of the denition as close as possible to that of semi-closure. For semi-closure it does matter what comes from E and what from π. Second, cl(E, π) may not be an FPSK. As no restrictions have been placed on π, it may, for example, take a disjunction to , so that that disjunction is also true in cl(E, π), without either of the disjuncts being true in cl(E, π). Another reason that cl(E, π) may not be an FPSK is that it can be inconsistent. Taking the closure of (E, π) is like doing the Kripke iteration starting from E π except that monotonicity is forced. The following lemma gives a condition under which cl(E, π) is an FPSK: Lemma 5. Let S be a set of sentences, π a function S → { , ⊥} and E an FPSK such that cl(E, π) is consistent. For each s ∈ S, let T r s = (N s , < s , l s ) be a tree for s relative to S with more than one node. Let e s be the function from N s to { , ⊥, +} dened by having, for each n ∈ N s , e(n) = (⊥; +) if l(n) is true (false; undened) in cl(E, π). If for each s, e s is an evaluation of T r s relative to S and (∅, ∅), then cl(E, π) is an FPSK. Proof. Let E * be the result of applying the strong Kleene jump to cl(E, π).
We need to show that cl(E, π) is an extension of E * and that E * is an extension of cl(E, π). The former follows directly from the denition of cl. To 26 The strong Kleene jump is dened on pages 700703 of (Kripke 1975) where it is denoted φ. The notion of a xed point is dened on page 703. demonstrate the latter it is enough to show that for all s ∈ S, s is false in E * if π(s) = ⊥ and true in E * if π(s) = . So let an s ∈ S be given.
As e s is an evaluation of T r s and assigns π(s) to the root labeled s, e s and thereby cl(E, π) assign values to the immediate successors of the root/the constituents of s in such a way that (if s is an atomic sentence with the truth predicate) the T-scheme is satised (because the assignment of π(s ) to end nodes labeled with a s ∈ S implies that the third bullet of SE5 is not applied) or (if s is any other type of sentence) the strong Kleene scheme is satised.
Each of those constituents φ satises the T-schema/the strong Kleene scheme in relation to its constituents: if φ is an element of S this follows from similar considerations about the root and its immediate successors in T r φ , and if not it follows from the denition of cl(E, π).
For each constituent, continue like this until either 1) reaching sentences that do not have constituents or 2) passing from atomic sentences with the truth predicate to their constituents. Having the latter (with their associated truth values) in cl(E, π) is sucient for having s false in E * if π(s) = ⊥ and having s true in E * if π(s) = .
Theorem 6. SE is consistent. Proof. We prove by induction that SE α is consistent and that I is an extension of SE α . The base and limit cases are trivial. So for the successor case, let an α be given and assume that I is an extension of SE α . Let s be a sentence.
Claim 6.1. s is not made both true and false by SE α among the same S. Proof. To prove the claim it must be demonstrated that a) every tree for s relative to S has an evaluation relative to SE α and b) there is not one tree for s relative to S all the evaluations for which assign to the root, and another tree for s relative to S all the evaluations for which assign ⊥ to the root. Let T r s be a tree for s relative to S. We construct an evaluation for T r s as follows: 27 1. For each node n of T r s , if l(n) is true (false) in I, then assign the value (⊥) to n. 27 The most straightforward approach to constructing such an evaluation will not work.
If we simply assign values to the end nodes according to the rule if the label is in the truth set of SE α /⊥ if the label is in the falsity set/+ otherwise, and then assign values to the non-end nodes according to SE2-SE5, the result is not necessarily a tree-evaluation relative to the given evaluation. For example, let φ and ψ be labels of two end nodes and assume they are in neither the truth set nor the falsity set. Just above them may be a node labeled φ ∨ ψ which is in the truth set. According to SEb, the node should be assigned , while SE3 dictates that it should instead be given the value +. (As is proved below, either φ or ψ would eventually be made true, but compositionality is something that holds in the xed point, not at every level leading up to it.) 3. Starting from those end nodes labeled with an element of S and going through their predecessors from the bottom up, ensure that the rst two bullets of each of SE2SE5 are satised.
4. For each non-end node that is assigned a value in step 3, if there are other non-end nodes with the same label, copy the assigned value to them. Then repeat steps 3 and 4 starting from those nodes. To see that this is an evaluation we rst need to verify that every node is assigned exactly one of the three values. As step 5 assigns + to all nodes that have not already received a truth value, and + is assigned in no other step, this reduces to showing that no node is assigned both and ⊥ in the rst four steps. The consistency of I implies that this does not happen in step 1, and step 2 expressly avoids nodes that have been given a value in step 1 and at most assigns one value to other nodes. For steps 3 and 4 I will just give the intuitive idea for what should formally be an induction argument concerning a transnite, monotonic sequence of partial tree-evaluations where values are added to nodes one at a time (in steps 3 and 4 from the bottom up), and I will stick to the example of a node n that is labeled with a disjunction φ ∨ ψ and assigned ⊥ at some point in the process, leaving the other cases to the reader. We need to show that this node was not already assigned previously in the process, and we can assume that at this point no other node is assigned both and ⊥.
If n is assigned ⊥ in step 3, it has successors labeled φ and ψ that are both assigned ⊥ and therefore not . Hence, those two sentences are not true in I, so neither is φ ∨ ψ, ergo n was not assigned in step 1. It also follows directly from those two nodes not having been assigned that n has not been assigned in step 3. Since n is a non-end node, it was not assigned any value in step 2. Finally, it can not have been assigned in step 4 (even though a step 4 can precede a step 3), for that would imply that the node from which it was copied had successors labeled φ and ψ at least one of which would have been assigned . That is impossible, for had that assignment happened in step 1 or 2, it would also have happened to the successor of n with the same label (in the latter case because they would then both be end nodes); and had it happened in step 3, it would have been copied in step 4.
If instead n is assigned ⊥ in step 4, then some other node m labeled φ ∨ ψ was assigned ⊥ in step 3 and then the same reasoning can be used to show that n was not assigned in steps 1, 3 or 4. That it was also not in step 2 is due to the fact that it follows from m being assigned a value in step 3 that m is a non-end node and that therefore φ ∨ ψ is not in S.
We can now proceed to show that what is constructed is an evaluation of T r s relative to S and SE α by verifying that all the clauses are satised. The induction hypothesis implies that SEb is satised after step 1. SEc and SE1 are as well. SEa is satised for the following reason: it is obvious that it is after step 1; in step 2 values are only assigned to nodes with a label that only appear on other end nodes, save perhaps the root, so the same values are assigned to all other non-root nodes with the same labels in that step; and step 4 is in place to ensure that violations of SEa in step 3 are taken care of.
Bullets one and two of SE2SE5 are satised after step 1, may not be after step 2, but then are again after step 3. Let m be a node that has a value copied to it in step 4, and assume that m has immediate successors (there is nothing to show if not). The node from which the value was copied has immediate successors with the same labels, and there the rst two bullets of SE2SE5 were satised, so they are also satised for m and its immediate successors.
Step 2 ensures that the third bullet of SE5 is vacuously satised.
The last bullet of each of SE2SE5 is satised by step 5.
With that, part a) is dealt with. For part b), let T r s and T r s be two trees for s relative to S. Let T r s be their union (in the obvious but not literal meaning of this word). T r s is also a tree for s relative to S, as the properties of having only nite branches and only having the root and end nodes labeled with elements of S are preserved. It is easily seen that, excluding evaluations which assign + to end-nodes labeled with elements of S, any evaluation of T r s can be restricted to an evaluation of T r s and an evaluation of T r s .
As it has been shown that T r s has such an evaluation, T r s and T r s have evaluations that assign the same value to their roots. Now assume that s is made true among S (the case of falsity is similar).
Claim 6.2. s is intrinsically true. Proof. Let π be the function that describes the truth values that the elements of S are given. Obviously, s is not intrinsically false, for then the constructed tree-evaluation makes the root false, and therefore s would not have been made true. By generalization it follows that I π is consistent. As a closure rule can only produce a truth value for a sentence that contradicts an intrinsic truth or falsity from other truth values that contradict intrinsic truths or falsities, it further follows that cl − (I, π) is also consistent.
Under the assumption that s is made true among S, what happened in step 2 of the construction was that each end node with a label s from S was given exactly the value π(s ). Ergo, for all non-root nodes, the value assigned is the same as the one the label has according to cl − (I, π). From the assumption that s is made true, it follows that the root is assigned ;
and hence it follows from the fact that the two rst bullets of SE2SE5 are satised that s cannot be made false by one more application of a closure rule to cl − (I, π). Generalizing this observation to all the elements of S, it follows that cl(I, π) = cl − (I, π), i.e. that cl(I, π) is consistent. So according to lemma 5, cl(I, π) is an FPSK, since the constructed evaluation of T r s is exactly the function e s mentioned in that lemma.
Assume for reductio that s is false in some FPSK. By the denition of I it follows that there is an FPSK, I * , which is an extension of I and in which s is false. Dene a new evaluation of T r s the same way as above but using I * instead of I in step 1. This is an evaluation of T r s relative to I * and hence according to lemma 1 and the induction hypothesis also relative to SE α , and it assigns ⊥ to the root. This is a contradiction.
It can be concluded that s is true in an FPSK and not false in any. Hence, no sentence that is true or false in I π has the opposite truth value in an FPSK. It follows that no sentence that is true or false in cl(I, π) has the opposite truth value in an FPSK. Ergo cl(I, π) = I, i.e. s is intrinsically true.
As s was arbitrary, I is an extension of SE α+1 . From this it nally follows that s is not made both true and false in SE α+1 , period.
Theorem 7 (S E is compositional and satises the T-schema). For all sentences φ and ψ, w's ξ with at most the variable v free, and constants c such that I(c) ∈ S, the following holds:
• ¬φ = i φ = ⊥.
• ¬φ = ⊥ i φ = .
• φ ∨ ψ = i φ = or ψ = .
• φ ∨ ψ = ⊥ i φ = ⊥ and ψ = ⊥.
• ∃vξ = i for some constant k, ξ(v/k) = .
• ∃vξ = ⊥ i for all constants k, ξ(v/k) = ⊥.
• T (c) = i I(c) = .
• T (c) = ⊥ i I(c) = ⊥. Proof. The right-to-left direction is, in each case, simple: Consider a level where the right-hand side is satised. Then at the next level, the tree for the sentence on the left-hand side consisting of just the root and immediate successors thereof will do the job.
The left-to-right direction can be proved by induction on the smallest level that decides the sentence on the left-hand side. Such a level is always indexed by a successor ordinal, so the base and limit cases are trivial. Let α be an ordinal, and s a sentence that is decided at level α + 1 and not at any lower level. Let S be a set of sentences that s was decided among, and let T r s be a tree that decided s relative to S at level α + 1. Again we construct a tree-evaluation, this time by taking these steps:
1. For each node n of T r s , if l(n) is true (false) in SE α , then assign the value (⊥) to n.
2. Starting from each node assigned a value in step 1 and working downwards, ensure that the rst two bullets of each of SE2SE5 are satised, by assigning values to immediate successors that their labels have in SE. This is possible according to the induction hypothesis.
3. For each node that is assigned a value in step 2, if there are other nodes with the same label, copy the assigned value to them. Then repeat steps 2 and 3 starting from those nodes.
4. Assign the value of each element of S according to SE to end nodes labeled with those sentences. 5. Starting from each node assigned a value in steps 1, 3 and 4 and working upwards, ensure that the rst two bullets of SE2SE5 are satised.
6. For each node that is assigned a value in step 5, if there are other nodes with the same label, copy the assigned value to them. Then repeat steps 5 and 6 starting from those nodes.
7. Assign + to all remaining nodes. This is an evaluation of T r s relative to SE α : SEb, SEc and SE1 are satised after step 1. That SEa and SE2SE5 are satised is demonstrated in the same way as in the previous proof.
If follows that this evaluation assigns the same value to the root as s has in SE. From this it again follows that, if this value is (⊥) and s is of the form ¬φ, then the immediate successor of the root (labeled φ) is assigned ⊥ ( ), and similarly for the other bullets of the theorem; in the last case because step 4 ensures that bullet 3 of SE5 does not come into play. Whenever (⊥)
is assigned to a node, the label of that node is true (false) in SE. This follows from monotonicity in the case of step 1, from the induction hypothesis in the case of step 2, from the right-to-left direction of this proof in the case of step 5, and is trivial for the other steps. From this the desired conclusion can be deduced.
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Comparison and discussion Gupta has one more trick up his sleeve; a trick that cannot be dealt with using the approach of this paper alone. Replace A3 and A5 with these sentences:
A3 † : A3 † is true is true A5 † : A3 † is not true is true
Under the present theory these sentences become undened, and as a consequence B4 does as well. But the same old reason for B4 being intuitively true seems to have undiminished power: A3 † and A5 † are intuitively contradictory, so the fact that they are not both true is independent of their specic truth values.
What is required to make the formal theory match the intuition is that the
(with obvious notation) is made true even though two of the conjuncts of the antecedent are undened, the other two true, and the consequent false. We would need a theory for which theorem 7 does not hold, and a point of this paper has been to investigate how far we can go with supervaluation while retaining exactly that.
I will return to this version of Gupta's Challenge below and rst undertake a comparison between the theory presented in this paper and the various versions of Kripke's theory.
The basic version can be reformulated using trees as follows: For each sentence, consider only the tree for that sentence that stops one node below any node labeled with a sentence of the form T (c) for some constant c. Further, remove the third bullet from SE5, and let SEa and SEb apply only to end nodes. Then check only one evaluation of this tree, namely the one that assigns + to all end nodes to which none of SEb, SEc or SE1 applies. If the root is assigned a proper truth value by this tree-evaluation, then (and only then) is the sentence in question given that value.
28
The weak Kleene scheme version can of course be obtained similarly if proper modications are made to clauses SE3 and SE4.
The simple Kripkean supervaluation version can be reconstructed using the same trees and by restricting attention to evaluations that assign proper truth values to all nodes. The more sophisticated supervaluation versions then correspond to considering even fewer dierent tree-evaluations.
29
So all these versions of Kripke's theory can be reformulated using trees, and hence, in a sense, the framework of this paper is a generalization of Kripke's.
In fact, they can be reformulated using just a certain class of rather small trees. With the perspective aorded by the more general framework, this can be seen to be an arbitrary and unreasonable restriction. Kripkean supervaluation only looks forward through one iteration of the truth predicate, so to speak. The starred versions of Gupta's Challenge show that a supervaluation method should look forward through an arbitrary number of iterations.
However, there is another sense in which the present theory is not a generalization compared to Kripke's work. He does consider the set of all xed points for the jump operation in abstraction from methods of arriving at these xed points. And the theory considered in this paper is just one of these xed points for the strong Kleene jump. (This follows from theorem 7, together with the fact that atomic sentences with ordinary predicates are assigned truth values the right way.) So in that sense, the merit of the tree framework is merely that it provides a natural method for reaching this xed point from below. But that is philosophically important. Knowing that an evaluation is a xed point tells you that there is an answer of sorts to any question about why a given sentence is true. However, it is consistent with the evaluation being a xed point that such answers go around in a circle, which is unacceptable; the reality side of the correspondence relation must be logically prior to the language side. Thus, the existence of a method for reaching a xed point from below is a necessary condition for it to be correspondence-theoretically acceptable.
The proof of theorem 6 reveals that the xed point is intrinsic, i.e. no sentence has a proper truth value in it if it has the opposite truth value in some other 28 An alternative is to remove clause 1) in the denition of full tree (and hence also the word otherwise in clause 2); equip the trees (still only having nite branches) for a given sentence with only the one evaluation just described; and count a sentence as true (false) i some tree for it assigns (⊥) to the root. This would result in the xed point being already reached at level 1. See (Davis 1979; Hazen 1981) .
29 Gupta's theory can be reformulated using the same trees with just one evaluation, namely the one in which the end nodes are assigned values based on the evaluation of the previous level.
xed point. However, the xed point is not the largest intrinsic xed point, for the following sentence is intrinsically true but undened in the xed point: This sentence is true or the Liar is false.
30 My contention is that this example tells against the largest intrinsic xed point, not the theory of this paper: this sentence can consistently be true and cannot consistently be false (because then both disjuncts should be false and the second cannot be), but that should not be sucient cause for actually counting it as true, when we require groundedness and not just non-arbitrariness. That the sentence can consistently be true and cannot consistently be false does not imply that there is a grounded fact to which the sentence can correspond. At any level where not at least one of the two sentences referred to in the disjuncts already has a truth value there is no such grounded fact. Hence, it should remain undened.
It is not at all clear how the largest intrinsic xed point ts in with the intuitive picture of truth that we get from Kripke, Gupta (1982, p. 37) writes, and asks rhetorically By what sort of stage-by-stage process do we reach this xed point? The largest xed point is indeed not intuitively satisfactory. We should aim somewhat lower, 31 and when we do so, we can hit the target through a stage-by-stage process.
The point of this paper has been to carve out a larger class of grounded truths and falsities than Kripke managed to. I believe that all sentences that are true (false) according to the formal theory are genuinely true (false), assuming of course that the model accurately represents the non-semantic facts. That is, the formal theory is sound with respect to The Correct Theory of Grounded Truth (which is just another way of saying that it is correspondence-theoretically acceptable).
Is it possible to carve out an even larger class? I leave that question open. In section 1 I argued that all facts that are available at a given level should be utilized by the formal theory when assigning truth values. I have formulated a theory that exploits more of the available facts (while stopping short of exploiting non-facts as Kripke's and revision theory supervaluation do), but I am in no position to claim that it exploits all of the available facts. That is, I do not claim that the formal theory is complete with respect to The Correct Theory of Grounded Truth.
The version of Gupta's Challenge with A3 † and A5 † may be considered a counterexample to completeness. We are forced to so consider it if we accept the claims made about the rst version of the Challenge in the beginning of this paper and nd ourselves unable to point to a relevant dierence between the two versions to justify the unequal results. The only plausible candidate for a relevant dierence is compositionality: in one case all the sentences can be assigned proper truth values in a compositional way and in the other we cannot, given that A3 † and A5 † should be undened by virtue of being ungrounded. Even though they are ungrounded, it is still a fact that is 30 The formalization of the sentence is T (ct) ∨ ¬T (c l ) where I(ct) = T (ct) ∨ ¬T (c l ) and I(c l ) = ¬T (c l ). available at the rst level that they contradict each other, so the necessary facts in which to ground the truth of B4 seem to be there. Does the demand for compositionality trump the force of the intuitive argument that is the same for all the versions of Gupta's Challenge?
If not, we have ended up in a dilemma: the desideratum to use all the information available at each level to produce new truth values conicts with the compositionality desideratum. Let me very briey and very supercially consider the possibility of resolving that dilemma in favor of the former desideratum. I argued in sections 2 and 3 that the lack of compositionality that consists in having true disjunctions with undened disjuncts (together with undened disjunctions with undened disjuncts) is unacceptable. However, the kind of non-compositionality needed to get the same result for the A3 † /A5 † version as for the other versions is dierent and perhaps less bad:
false conjunctions with one conjunct undened and the other true or undened (together with undened conjunctions with one conjunct undened and the other true or undened).
32 Pursuing that idea, however, involves an even more drastic modication of Kripke's theory than the one investigated in this paper and must be postponed.
However, even if the present theory is incomplete, I believe there are two ideas in this paper that would have to be used also in formulating the ultimate theory: 1) The idea of using all available information at each stage while not using information that turns out to be false when the nal evaluation is reached.
2) The idea of doing supervaluation that is not limited to one iteration of the truth predicate, using the tree method. The problem of the †-version seems to be connected with the limits on the use of the strong truth rule, not directly with the central ideas of this paper.
There are also other issues I have ignored. Kripke's theory is confronted by the problem of semantic openness and the revenge problem.
33 So is the present theory. I have employed the strong rule for truth where it is safe.
The challenge of providing a principled explanation of why it should not be used where it is unsafe, i.e. an explanation that does not merely appeal to the fact that it is unsafe, is left untouched.
